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Conservative controlled states cut infrastructure and welfare
spending in response to increased exposure to global trade.
The past year has seen growing controversy over the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal which
is currently being negotiated between 12 countries, the U.S. included. Concerns about economic
dislocation stemming from similar trade deals often lead social democratic governments to
increase spending on welfare programs to compensate citizens. Given the lack of a U.S. social
democratic party, the response of state governments to global economic liberalization is often
quite different. In new research, Brian Krueger and Ping Xu find that when exposed to higher
levels of international trade, left-leaning state governments maintain their levels of welfare and
infrastructure spending, while conservative administrations decrease it. They explain these
differing reactions may be partly explained by the increasing levels of policy polarization in state
governments. 
The past half-century has witnessed a new round of increased global economic openness and
integration.  In a highly globalized world, international capital can more freely exit from high-tax-
high-spending countries to low-tax-low-spending countries, perhaps forcing governments to slash
taxes and benefits in order to attract and retain footloose capital. This “race to the bottom” (RTB)
logic has become conventional wisdom in many public activist circles, which has fuelled the popular outcry
against globalization.  Some even suggest that economic globalization implies the demise of the generous
European welfare states.
But social scientists found something different when testing this iconic RTB logic.  The evidence most often
contradicted the dreams of free marketers and the fears of anti-globalization activists.  When advanced
democracies are exposed to higher levels of global trade, if they do anything at all, they tend to increase their
social spending in order to compensate citizens for the dislocations and economic anxieties associated with
economic globalization.  More precisely, the evidence suggests that when social democratic or other left parties
control governments, global trade stimulates increased spending; without strong social democratic parties,
economic openness generally has no effect on government spending.
Because a viable social democratic party does not exist in the United States and because it ranks near last on
every left-labor power metric, the United States is often viewed as an empirical outlier that does not fit neatly into
these studies that reserves a special role for left parties.  It is not fully understood if and how economic
globalization interacts with the special features of American political institutions to influence government
spending.  This lack of attention is unfortunate given the U.S.’s outsized importance in the global economy and
the retrenchment of some social programs in the U.S. over time. Luckily, the 50 American states have significant
variation in exposure to global trade, differ widely in the ideologies of their state governments, and control much
of the public spending due to the United States’ high level of fiscal decentralization.  By focusing on the U.S.
states over the past few decades, we can see the long-term relationship between global trade exposure and state
government spending in areas such as social welfare and infrastructure.
Our latest study suggests that global trade is an important element in creating state-level policy polarization in the
U.S.  We find that after accounting for a variety of other factors, liberal and conservative American state
governments have quite different strategies in adjusting state social welfare spending when heavily involved in
global trade. As shown in Figure 1, when exposed to higher levels of international trade, liberal state governments
maintain their commitment to moderately growing welfare spending. Yet, the pattern for conservative states is
strikingly different. When increasingly exposed to international trade, conservative state governments will first
reduce their support of social welfare and then eventually cut welfare spending. A very similar pattern is observed
for state-level infrastructure spending, as shown in Figure 2.  When responding to the pressures of higher global
trade, liberal state governments reject the “race to the bottom” logic.  For liberal state governments, regardless of
whether the state has high or low global trade exposure, infrastructure investments do not significantly differ.   Yet
again, conservative governments react to increased global trade by sharply reducing the spending on
infrastructure just as the RTB logic predicts.
Figure 1- Predicted change in welfare spending as trade exposure varies under liberal and conservative
state governments
Figure 2 – Predicted change in infrastructure spending as trade exposure varies under liberal and
conservative state governments
Our findings about global trade in the American states somewhat mirrors those from cross-national studies.
 Cross-national evidence suggests that economic globalization leads to the acceleration of spending on welfare
state programs when social democratic parties are in power, whereas economic globalization tends to have a null
or modestly negative effect under more right-leaning governments.U.S. state government ideology also
conditions the effect of global trade on government spending, but compared to cross-national patterns, the center
of gravity shifts in the American states dramatically towards lower spending. Put another way, in the American
states, global trade exposure has either no effect or a negative influence on public spending, which contrasts
sharply with the positive or no influence on public spending found in most cross-national studies.
Our results also suggest that increased trade exposure may be part of the story about the increased policy
polarization in the United States. Polarization has become a heated topic in American politics but the bulk of
attention has focused on mass and elite ideology.  Our results suggest that we should pay more attention to policy
polarization across the American states.  After all, the policy environment is what actually affects people’s lives. 
And as we show, elite ideological differences only sometimes translate into different policy outcomes. For
example, with low reliance on trade, a condition more common in the past, conservative and liberal governments
grew social welfare and infrastructure programs at a similar rate.  Yet, we find that liberal and conservative
government spending patterns diverge dramatically when state economies are highly exposed to international
markets. Conservative U.S. state governments tend to cut social welfare programs when in a high trade
environment; liberal states generally maintain their policy of modest increased investments regardless of trade
levels.
Because this is not a common pattern across other advanced democracies we speculate about why U.S.
conservative governments are especially successful at translating their ideological policy preferences into policy
outcomes under high levels of trade exposure. We know that sizable parts of the U.S continue to support laissez-
faire solutions to policy problems and U.S. faith in free market solutions far exceeds that of most other advanced
democracies.  One possibility is that conservative U.S. state governments, already inclined to cut spending on
certain programs, take advantage of the pressures of globalization, and the well understood story of capital flight,
to better convince various policy stakeholders that reductions are now unavoidable.   It may well be that the U.S.’s
peculiar confidence in market-based doctrine combined with increased global trade could be a driving force for
policy polarization in the United States, with only the most market oriented conservative states racing to the
bottom.
This article is based on the paper, ‘Trade Exposure and the Polarization of Government Spending in the American
States’, in American Politics Research.
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